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We investigate the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) noncooperative game theoretic bargaining model of legislative
equilibrium. Legislative outcomes are sensitive to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they
will be voted on. With a random proposal recognition rule and a closed amendment rule (proposals are voted up
or down with no room for amendments) the model predicts no delays in beneﬁt allocation, that beneﬁts will be
allocated to a minimal winning coalition, and that beneﬁts within the coalition will be stronglyskewed in favor
of the proposer. In contrast, with a random proposal recognition rule and an open amendment rule (proposals
maybe amended before theyare voted on) the model predicts delay s in beneﬁt allocation, that beneﬁts will be
more evenlyspread among winning coalition members, and that coalitions need not be restricted to a minimal
majority. With experience we ﬁnd strong qualitative support for the model’s predictions: All proposals are
passed without delaywith the closed rule versus 81% of all proposals with the open rule. Minimal winning
coalitions are eﬀectivelyproposed in 67% of all cases with the closed rule versus 4% with the open rule, and
beneﬁts are more evenlydistributed with open rule. Quantitative predictions of the model fail however: Most
importantly, proposers consistently fail to allocate themselves anything close to what the theory predicts. Further,
the probabilityof immediate acceptance is much higher than predicted in the open rule as proposers consistently
expand the winning coalition beyond the model’s prediction in attempts to limit amendments. The evolution of
playover time is reported (outcomes under both treatments are much more similar earlyon then later). Tests
show that subjects’ votes in favor of a proposed allocation are signiﬁcantlyaﬀ ected bytheir own share (in the
expected direction) but that the distribution of shares across all voters has no signiﬁcant eﬀect.
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11 Introduction
Political economists have suggested that the two most important institutional variables that explain ﬁscal policies
are the structure of the government and budgetary procedures, namely all the rules and regulations determining
how budgets are prepared, approved and implemented. Non cooperative legislatures theory has focused on providing
an answer to the following question: Do budget procedures matter for the determination of budget balance and its
composition?
In their important contribution, Baron and Ferejohn (1989) present a sequential model of multilateral bargaining
with majority rule. They consider a bargaining model where n risk neutral players are randomly selected to propose
a division of a ﬁxed sum of money where agreement requires the consent of a simple majority. They focus on the
voting procedure (amendment rule) as it establishes who has inﬂuence on the ﬁnal budget document, as well, as
when and how. They distinguish between two types of amendment rules: closed rules and open rules.
There is a clear trade-oﬀ between these amendment rules. With a random proposal recognition rule and a closed
amendment rule (proposals are voted up or down with no room for amendments) the model predicts no delays
in beneﬁt allocation, that beneﬁts will be allocated to a minimal winning coalition, and that beneﬁts within the
coalition will be strongly skewed in favor of the proposer. In contrast, with a random proposal recognition rule and
an open amendment rule (proposals may be amended before they are voted on) the model predicts delays in beneﬁt
allocation, that beneﬁts will be more evenly spread among winning coalition members, and that coalitions need not
be restricted to a minimal majority.
In this paper, we examine whether the equity and timing predictions of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) are realized
in the laboratory. We ran several sessions where ﬁve subjects were asked to divide $25.00 among themselves where
only the amendment rule diﬀered across sessions. We found that over time the diﬀerent procedures led to diﬀerent
budget outcomes in terms of size and allocation of beneﬁt. With experience we ﬁnd strong qualitative support for
the model’s predictions: All proposals are passed without delay with the closed rule versus 81% of all proposals with
the open rule. Minimal winning coalitions are eﬀectively proposed in 67% of all cases with the closed rule versus 4%
with the open rule, and beneﬁts are more evenly distributed with open rule.
However, through an examination of the detailed pattern of play we observe that the quantitative predictions
of the model fail. First, we found that the proposer never proposed himself a share as large as that predicted by
theory. Although divisions in the closed rule became more uneven with the proposer seeking a larger share of the
budget than the other members of the coalition. However, the proposer never proposed himself a share as large as
that predicted by theory. Over the course of the session subjects learned the implications of majority rule voting
with no possibility of an amendment by oﬀering small amounts (if any at all) to non majority members.
Second, divisions in the open rule oﬀered positive amounts of money to more subjects and were accepted more
rapidly than predicted by theory. Subjects discovered that amendments are costly and proposed divisions which were
more likely to be seconded. These distributions either took the form of oﬀering an even split among the subjects or
oﬀering only one player less than one dollar.
Finally, in contrast to other experimental studies of bargaining games, we ﬁnd that individuals elected to accept
proposals based solely on their individual return (in the expected direction) and were not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by
equity concerns. For example, in the ﬁrst round of the open rule elections subjects would vote in favor of any proposal
oﬀering them more than 16% of the amount to be divided and voted against all proposals oﬀering them less than
16%; irrespective of fairness of the proposal being voted upon.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce the model studied by Baron and Ferejohn
(1989) and deﬁne the basic notation. In section III we discuss our experimental design. An analysis of the results
of our experimental study are oﬀered in section IV. We examine how these proposals change during the experimental
sessions and to provide explanations for the patterns observed. We ﬁnd that behavior converges to two diﬀerent
2strategies in each treatment. Furthermore, we examine whether the underlying assumptions of our econometric
models are indeed valid in our setting by utilizing a test statistic which compares the parametric estimator to a semi
parametric estimator. We summarize our ﬁndings and compare our results with the existing literature on bargaining
experiments in section V.
2 Theoretical Model and Predictions
Baron and Ferejohn (1989) study a model reﬂecting the sequential nature of legislative action as structured by the
rules employed to govern proposal making, amending and voting. The legislature consists of n members each of
whom represents a legislative district, a recognition rule that determines which member may make a proposal, an
amendment rule, and a voting rule. The task of the legislature is to allocate a ﬁxed quantity of divisible beneﬁts
among legislative districts according to majority rule. Each member of the legislature is assumed to have risk neutral
preferences for beneﬁts allocated only to their district, hence preferences are diametrically opposed. They restrict
attention to stationary subgame perfect equilibria1.
At the beginning of each legislative session each member i is chosen with probability of being recognized pi =










j ≤ 1. This proposal is then the motion on the ﬂoor. Each member i has the






i where δ is the discount factor.2 They distinguish between two types of amendment
rules (voting procedures): closed and open rules. Let’s ﬁrst consider the closed rule.
A closed rule is one in which the legislature must vote either for or against the proposal made by a member of the
legislature without any opportunity of amendment. The legislature votes on the proposed distribution, essentially
pegging it against the status quo, i.e. x =( 0 ,...,0). If the proposition is approved, the legislative adjourns. If
the motion fails, the beneﬁts are not allocated, and the legislature moves to the next round. In the next round the
payoﬀs are discounted and the process starts over again. Under the closed rule, the predicted stationary equilibria
split if there is the possibility of an inﬁnite number of sessions is δ/n for (n −1)/2 members, [1−δ(n−1)/2n]
for the recognized member, and 0 for the remaining (n −1)/2 members.3 Furthermore, the proposition should be
accepted by a minimal majority and that in the ﬁrst round.
In the open rule, amendments can be made to the motion on the ﬂoor. In the open rule, one amendment can
be made and it is made by member j which is recognized amongst the remaining (n −1) members, that is with
probability
pj ￿
k￿=i pk, which in our case turns out to be
p
(n−1)p = 1
n−1. This member can second the proposal, and
then it is voted on as in the closed rule — if it passes, the legislature adjourns, and if it fails, they move to the next
session — or he may propose an amendment to it. Note that the case where the amending process is ﬁnished and a
vote is required may be referred to as ‘move the previous question’. An amendment in this case is considered as an
entirely new proposition. If an amendment is proposed, then the legislature votes between the motion on the ﬂoor
and the proposed amendment. If the amendment is defeated, the original proposal remains on the ﬂoor and the next
session begins, hence, payoﬀs are discounted. If they vote in favor of the amendment, then it becomes the motion
on the ﬂoor, and payoﬀs are discounted as the legislature moves to the following session.
1A strategy proﬁle is stationary subgame perfect if it is subgame perfect and if it does not depend on the current date and past history.
These equilibria have the focal point property that the values of identical subgames are the same.
2We only consider the symmetric case even though their model is not limited to it. A symmetric recognition rule will not bias the
results of the legislature in favor of any member as the member is selected at random to make a proposal. Having symmetric utility
functions is still relatively general since δ can be interpreted as either or both the time discount factor or the probability of reelection,
i.e. δ = Pr(being re-elected)× time discount factor. Hence, as we have said, once it moves to the following session, the utilities are
discounted and the process starts over again. They consider two possibilities, a ﬁnite and an inﬁnite number of sessions, we will only deal
with the inﬁnite case.
3This division is for an odd number of members of legislature (n).
3Treatment Closed Rule Open Rule
Number of Subjects (n) 5 5
Discount Factor (δ) 0.8 0.8
Number of subjects who will receive a
positive payoﬀ besides the proposer 2 2
Number of subjects who
receive zero payoﬀ 2 2
Share to the proposer 0.68 0.52
Share to other subjects receiving
positive payoﬀs 0.16 0.24
Probabilityof proposal being
approved in the 1st round 1 0.5
Table 1: Theoretical Predictions: Stationary Equilibria
The predictions of the open rule take a slightly diﬀerent form. First, the number of people getting a strictly
positive money oﬀer beside the recognized member is not necessarily (n − 1)/2. This number, denoted m(δ,n), is
determined by the formula
m(δ,n) ∈ argmax
m
































































Another diﬀerence in predictions is that the proposition is not necessarily approved in the ﬁrst round. Finally, the
recognized member has less power than in the closed rule case and thus her share decreases. Her share is given by





For example, with a sample size of ﬁve and a discount factor of 0.8 (our speciﬁc n and δ), under the closed rule the
recognized member should receive 0.68 of the total amount to be divided, 2 other members should each receive 0.16
of the amount to be divided and the remaining 2 members would not receive any funds. The predicted stationary
equilibria split in the open rule if there is the possibility of an inﬁnite number of sessions is 0.52 for the recognized
member, 0.24 for (n − 1)/2 members,and 0 for the remaining (n − 1)/2 members. Thus, as in the closed rule two
subjects would not receive any funds but now the probability that the election ends in a single round is cut in half.
It should be noted that the fact that a ﬁfty plus one percent majority is predicted for the open rule is a special case,
for many other n and δ, the predicted coalition is much bigger. We summarize the theoretical predictions (for our
speciﬁc n and δ) in table 1.
We can summarize the predictions from theory as follows. First, an open rule creates delays in the approval of
a proposal. Second, a closed rule leads to the adoption of majoritarian allocation rules. That is, the beneﬁts are
allocated to 50 percent plus one fraction of the legislature. An open rule may lead to a distribution of beneﬁts in
4which more than the minimum majority of legislators receive positive net beneﬁts. Third, with an open rule the
distribution of beneﬁts within the winning majority are more egalitarian than with a closed rule.4 In the following
section we discuss the way we test the predictions of these theories in the laboratory setting.
3 Experimental Design
Five subjects were recruited for each experiment consisting of a series of ﬁfteen meetings (called elections) of the
legislature. Only the amendment rule diﬀered between sessions but not within any session. Recall, under the closed
rule the legislature must vote either for or against the proposal made by a member of the legislature without any
opportunity of amendment. If the proposal is accepted the game is over and the budget is approved; if it is rejected
a new member of the legislature can make another proposal which is again voted up or down. Under the open rule
the proposal can be amended from the ﬂoor. That is, the ﬁrst member selected makes a proposal. Another member
is then selected and she can either ask for a vote on the proposal in its current form or propose an amendment. In
the second case, the amendment is balloted against the proposal. The winner becomes the new proposal on the ﬂoor
and a new member is selected, and so forth. A total of four sessions were run for each treatment.5
At the start of each election in either treatment the ﬁve subjects became members of the legislature and were
randomly assigned a subject number by the experimenter. This number was known only to the individual subject and
changed across but not within elections. Each subject would then ﬁll out a proposal form and allocate $25.00 among
the members of the legislature by their subject numbers. Once the proposal forms were completed and collected
by the experimenter, a roll of a ﬁve sided die was used to determine which proposal would take the ﬂoor; based on
subject number. This proposal along with the subject number (but not the actual identity) was then posted on a
blackboard in both treatments.
Subsequently, in a closed rule session each subject would next complete a voting form to mark down whether
they accepted or rejected the division currently being proposed. The voting forms were then collected and tabulated
by the experimenter. If a simple majority accepted the proposal then the payoﬀ was implemented and the election
ended. If the proposal was rejected by a simple majority then each subject would have to propose a new division of
the remaining funds in the next round of the election. A discount rate of 0.8 was used in all sessions. The results of
the election were posted on the blackboard underneath the proposal. The blackboard contained information only on
the last four proposals which were voted upon.
In an open rule session each subject would subsequently complete a form where they would determine whether
they wished to second or amend the division currently proposed. The experimenter collected the forms and a roll
of a four sided die determines which subject would have the power to second or amend. If this subject seconded
the proposal it would pass to an election as in the closed rule. If this subject wished to amend the proposal, she
was required to propose an alternative distribution of the funds. In this case, a runoﬀ election was held between the
original proposal and the amendment. The amendment along with the subject number (but not the actual identity)
of the amender would be posted on the blackboard underneath the original proposal. A runoﬀ election form would
be completed by the subjects, collected, and tabulated by the experimenter. The proposal which was selected by a
simple majority would then be the standing proposal in the next round of the election. However, all amounts would
be discounted by 0.8 as there is a cost to having this extra election. The election continues in this manner until a
proposal is both seconded and approved by a simple majority.
4Another implication which we will not study is that a closed rule has been shown by Baron (1991) to lead to the adoption of more
ineﬃcient budgets.
5It should be noted that we originally designed this experiment to have ten elections in each session. After completing one session
of each treatment and eyeballing the data we were uncertain whether behavior within the sessions had converged to a rule of thumb
strategy. It was clear that the strategies were evolving in certain directions and we felt that increasing the number of elections to ﬁfteen,
we would see if there indeed was convergence.
5Subjects were recruited through announcements in undergraduate classes and advertisements in student news-
papers at the University of Pittsburgh and Carnegie Mellon University. The advertisements in student newspapers
resulted in recruiting a broad cross section of graduate and undergraduate students from both campuses. Subjects
were paid based on the results of four of these meetings which were randomly chosen (by four rolls of a ﬁfteen sided
die) at the conclusion of the experiment. Each subject also received a participation fee of $5.
An additional subject was recruited for each session to roll the dice during the session. We felt having a subject
roll the dice as opposed to the experimenter would ensure that the remaining subjects realized that outcomes were
determined at random. This subject was chosen at random at the beginning of each session by a roll of a six sided
die by the experimenter. This subject received a ﬁxed fee of ﬁfteen dollars for rolling the dice during the experiment.
Under both treatments a practice election was held to familiarize the subjects with the procedures and accounting
rules. In the case of the open rule we covered both the case of an amendment being made and not being made to
the motion on the ﬂoor. A copy of the instructions used in the closed rule and open rule sessions are provided in
Appendix A and B respectively. In the following section we present the results from these experiments.
4 Results
Table 2 reports several summary statistics from all of the sessions run for both treatments using every proposal6.A s
discussed in the preceding section, each subject proposes the division of the funds across the ﬁve subjects by subject
number using the proposal form. The individual’s subject number is clearly marked in the top right hand corner of
each proposal form. Results are separately reported for all elections of the play, for the ﬁrst ﬁve and for the last ﬁve
elections to illustrate changes in behavior.
There are several interesting discrepancies with the theory that immediately appear. First, the probability of a
proposal being accepted in the ﬁrst round under the open rule is higher than predicted. A t-test of the null hypothesis
that the probability the election will end at round one is equal to the theoretical prediction of 0.5 is rejected7.A s
shown in ﬁgure 1, as the session progresses, a higher percentage of elections end within one round in the open rule.8
Second, in each open rule session subjects quickly learn that amendments are costly. Thus, subjects increased
the share given to the two outsiders during the session which led to the higher acceptance rate of proposals in the
ﬁrst round. Furthermore in the last ﬁve elections of the open rule sessions, not a single subject oﬀered two zeros.
This is in sharp contrast with the theory that predicts that in both the closed and open rule sessions, subjects should
oﬀer strictly positive amounts of money to only two other players. The two remaining players should not be oﬀered
anything in either treatment. Subjects are clearly increasing their oﬀers to these members in order to reduce the
likelihood of an amendment being proposed. Notice that the proportion of subjects who are seconding the motion on
the ﬂoor increases from 65.5% in the ﬁrst ﬁve elections to 80.9% in the last ﬁve elections. Finally, in later elections
not a single election lasted more than two rounds whereas early on there were lengthy battles in each election.
Third, the proposers do not take as much as theory predicts in neither the open nor the closed rule. Theory
predicts that the proposer will oﬀer herself $17.00 and $13.00 in the closed rule and open rule respectively. A t-test
that the amounts oﬀered to oneself is equal to the theoretical prediction in both treatments is clearly rejected. In
the open rule subjects seem to oﬀer themselves a constant fraction while in the closed rule the share increases during
the session. However, in the last ﬁve elections the share oﬀered to oneself is only slightly more than 50% of the
6We are not examining solely the motion on the ﬂoor unless otherwise indicated.
7P>| t |=0 . 0011
8In the closed rule there were only two elections which entered multiple rounds. The original motions on the ﬂoor were (7,5,4,5,4) and
(6,3,7,3,6) which led to votes (accept, reject, reject, accept, reject) and (reject, reject, accept, reject, accept) respectively. In both cases,
the subjects who made the voting errors oﬀered themselves one dollar less in the subsequent round of the election than what they would
have received had they accepted the original motion on the ﬂoor. We think a strong argument can be made that these initial rejections
were due to errors made by subjects especially since they occured early in the sessions.
6Full Sample (All Elections) First Five Elections (1-5) Last Five Elections (11-15)
Closed Rule Open Rule Closed Rule Open Rule Closed Rule Open Rule
Probabilityof Proposal
Being Approved in Round 1
0.964 0.745 0.900 0.650 1.000 0.867
Probabilityof Proposal
Being Approved in Round 2
1.000 0.571 1.000 0.429 NA 1.000
Probabilityof Proposal
Being Approved in Round 3
NA 0.500 NA 0.250 NA NA
Amount to the














Receiving Zero Payoﬀs in Round 1
0.262 0.018 0.120 0.030 0.333 0.000
Average Sum of the Two Lowest













Probabilityof the Motion on the
Floor Being Seconded in Round 1*
NA 73.27 NA 65.49 NA 80.88
Numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations.
* Remember that the original proposer cannot amend his own proposal. In the experiment, the proposer completes a form to
preserve anonymity but it would not be selected and is therefore not included.



































































Figure 1: Probability of Acceptance in Round 1
7Sum of the Two Lowest Amounts Full Sample (All Elections) First Five Elections (1-5) Last Five Elections (11-15)
Proposed in Round 1 (o) Closed Rule Open Rule Closed Rule Open Rule Closed Rule Open Rule
o =0 . 00 26.18% 1.82% 12.00% 3.00% 33.33% 0.00%
0.00 <o≤2 . 00 15.27% 7.27% 9.00% 12.00% 32.00% 4.00%
2.00 <o≤4 . 00 9.82% 5.82% 9.00% 8.00% 0.00% 4.00%
4.00 <o≤6 . 00 10.18% 21.09% 15.00% 14.00% 5.33% 22.67%
6.00 <o≤8 . 00 19.64% 26.55% 27.00% 22.00% 13.33% 40.00%
8.00 <o≤10.00 0.73% 19.64% 1.00% 14.00% 0.00% 20.00%
o =1 0 . 00 18.18% 17.82% 27.00% 27.00% 16.00% 9.33%
Table 3: Descriptions of Two Lowest Amounts Oﬀered in Individual Proposals
theoretical prediction. In fact only three subjects oﬀered themselves more than $10.00 in the ﬁrst round of the last
ﬁve elections of the closed rule.9
Fourth, convergence of behavior across subjects over time diﬀers across treatments. A priori, we were expecting
standard errors to decrease over time. That is we believed the behavior of subjects would become increasingly similar
during the experiment. This is indeed the case in the open rule as one can see by comparing the standard errors
of the amount one oﬀers themselves and the share oﬀered to the two outsiders between the ﬁrst ﬁve and last ﬁve
elections. However, the standard deviations increase over time for the share oﬀered to the two outsiders in the closed
rule.
There seems to be a great deal of variation in the strategies that subjects employ to deal with these two outsiders.
We present the percentage of proposals that oﬀer these subjects funds in two dollar intervals in table 3. Kernel density
estimates10 of these oﬀers are shown in ﬁgure 2 and point out that the oﬀers are bunched at certain values and not
spread evenly in the intervals listed in table 3. We observe there is a clear shift of the density between the ﬁrst ﬁve
and last ﬁve elections in the closed rule. As well, in the last ﬁve elections of the open rule we see few proposals
oﬀering less than four dollars to the two outsiders.
Behavior after the tenth election can be characterized fairly simply as shown in table 4. In the closed rule, roughly
one third of the subjects were proposing each subject at least four dollars (20% of the pie in the ﬁrst round). This
strategy is deﬁned to be an even split (ES). The remaining two thirds were playing an extended version of the double
zero (DZ) strategy in which the sum of two lowest oﬀers is less than or equal to $2.00. For example, subjects would
oﬀer a split: 9, 7.50, 7.50, 0, 1. Clearly, the one dollar in this example is similar to a zero since they know it will
be rejected. A breakdown of oﬀers following the DZ strategy indicate that 51% of them contain two zeros. In fact,
96% of the oﬀers classiﬁed as DZ oﬀer at least one zero and an amount less than or equal to one dollar for the other
outsider. In the open rule only 4% of the oﬀers satisfy the double zero requirement as deﬁned above. However, there
is also a natural division into two major strategies for the open rule; the single zero (SZ) strategy and the ES. We
deﬁne the SZ strategy to be a proposal that oﬀers one subject one dollar or less, and the ES is deﬁned as before. Of
the subjects playing the SZ strategy, 61% oﬀered nothing to one player.
It is clear that oﬀers are evolving in opposite directions between the two treatments. We illustrate how the
treatments diﬀer in terms of allocation to oneself, allocation to non majority members and fairness of the oﬀers
across all subjects in the ﬁrst round of each election over the course of the session in ﬁgure 3. To analyze fairness in
this experiment we employ a fairness index (henceforth referred to as FI) which measures deviations from a uniform
9One subject oﬀered herself $15.00 in each of the last ﬁve elections while the other two subjects oﬀered themselves $13.00 and $15.00
but only in the last election.
10An Epanechnikov kernel was used for these estimates. A detailed description of this method is provided in the discussion of the
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Figure 2: Kernel Density Estimates
Closed Rule Open Rule
Double Zero Strategy 65.33% Single Zero Strategy 48%
Even Split 29.33% Even Split 40%
All other strategies 5.33% All other strategies 12%
Table 4: Categories of Behavior
9distribution of the money and is normalized to lie between 0 and 1 by dividing this value with that of the most uneven














ai is the amount allocated to player i, T is the total amount of money, and n is the number of players.
Notice both the open and closed rules start with virtually the same take for the proposer.11 Although there is
substantial growth in the take in the closed rule there is an immediate decline in the open rule and behavior quickly
converges. We perform a Mann-Whitney U test (or Wilcoxon rank-sum test) on the average value over the last ﬁve
periods of the take per subject which tests the hypothesis that two independent samples are from populations with
the same distribution. The null hypothesis that the open and closed rule have the same distribution of the take is
rejected (Prob>|z|=0 . 0006).
Similarly in the graph showing the average sum to the two outsiders the two treatments starts oﬀ at a similar
point but they quickly bifurcate. A Mann-Whitney U test on the average value over the last ﬁve periods of this
variable per subjects rejects the null hypothesis that these variables take the same values for these two groups
(Prob > |z| =0 . 0113). A Mann Whitney test also rejects the null hypothesis that the FI variable take the same
values for thee two groups (Prob>|z|=0 . 0051).
Two clear patterns seem to emerge from ﬁgure 3. First, the open and the closed rule generate diﬀerent level of
equity in the distribution of payoﬀs. Second, the behavior seems to change signiﬁcantly as the number of election
increases. It is our belief that the relationship between the election and the level of equity of the oﬀers in part reﬂects
learning. The type of learning we have in mind is that agents are slowly ﬁguring out the structure of the game. For
instance, even though the instructions clearly mention that a simply majority is all that is required to approve a
proposal, it may take subjects time to understand the strategic implications of that fact. Notice in ﬁgure 4 that the
percentage of subjects who oﬀer two zeroes in the closed rule increases over time.
We also plot the share that the proposer oﬀers herself when she follow the DZ strategy in ﬁgure 4. Notice
the increase in the share that the proposer oﬀers herself in the closed rule can be explained by the increase in the
proportion of subjects following the double zeros strategy. Although switching to play the DZ strategy would allow
subjects to increase their take, the amount taken is fairly constant across subjects following the DZ strategy after
the ﬁfth election. The graph of the average oﬀer to herself for all subjects moves proportionately with the graph of
oﬀers to herself conditional on playing the double zero strategy following the seventh election.
The increase in the proportion of subjects following the DZ strategy and the evolution of a session are highly
dependent on which oﬀers take the ﬂoor. Some subjects do not realize by themselves that they can oﬀer two zeroes,
but once such an oﬀer takes the ﬂoor, it is more likely that they will do so. For example in the fourth closed rule
session, an oﬀer satisfying the DZ requirements did not appear on the ﬂoor until the tenth election. Prior to this
election only one subject was making proposals consistent with the DZ strategy . However, by the twelfth election
four subjects were playing the DZ strategy.
Although the results seems surprising as the observed behavior departs from the theory the results do strengthen
the theoretical prediction of a more equitable distribution under the open rule. Although we have presented several
explanations for the observed behavior one may wonder if risk aversion is a valid explanation for the outcomes under
the closed rule. Recall, the theoretical model assumes risk neutral subjects. Risk aversion is only a valid explanation
if the proposer believes herself to be more risk averse than all the other members of the legislature.
As discussed above, subjects quickly learned that amendments are costly in the open rule sessions and made
proposals which were more likely to be seconded. Since subjects increasingly followed the SZ strategy it is not
surprising that as shown in table 5 the amount that subjects would turn down in order to create an amendment fell
by nearly one dollar in round one and one percentage point in share between the ﬁrst ﬁve and last ﬁve elections.
When constructing amendments subjects understood they should oﬀer the two worst oﬀ subjects larger (improved)
shares. This occurred in all but one instance. However, subjects did not immediately understand how to create an
11This is averaged across subjects in the ﬁrst round.
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Figure 3: Evolution of Various Aspects of the Oﬀers Over Time
Full Sample (All Elections) First Five Elections (1-5) Last Five Elections (11-15)
Percentage of Amendments
Oﬀering at Least Two Subjects
the Same or Greater Share
54.87 53.33 84.21
Percentage of Times the Two Worst
Oﬀ Receive an Improved Share
98.21 97.7 100
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Figure 4: Percentage of Subjects Oﬀering Two Zeroes and Their Oﬀers to Themselves in the Closed Rule
amendment which would be successful in the runoﬀ election. Notice that slightly less than 55% of the amendments
oﬀered improved shares to at least two other subjects besides the amender. Over the course of the sessions subjects
learned how to propose a successful amendment as 30% more amendments oﬀered improved shares to at least two
other subjects. Only two subjects in the last ﬁve elections suggested amendments that theory predicts would not be
approved.
It is clear that behavior diﬀers across treatments in terms of the distribution of beneﬁts. In terms of the voting
behavior of the individual subjects there also exists several diﬀerences across the treatments. In the following table
we present the number of people who vote for and against a given proposal based on the share of the funds they
would receive if it were accepted by a simple majority. We exclude voting data where the voter is the proposer since
it is obvious that in this case she will vote in favor of what she allocated to herself. Notice in table ??, that there
are several instances in the open rule sessions where subjects voted in favor of receiving less than 15% of the funds.
These circumstances occurred only in the last round of several multiple round elections. Also notice in the closed
rule that there were six instances that subjects rejected receiving between 20 to 25 percent of the funds available but
as mentioned earlier these can mostly be treated as mistakes12.




2FI it + β
3Tit +uit; µit ∼ N
￿
0,σ2￿
where vote is a limited dependent variable and our explanatory variables include the share the voter is receiving
(s), the fairness of the proposal as measured by the fairness index and time dummies (for every three elections) to
capture the adjustment process in a ﬂexible manner. We estimate this model using the probit and random eﬀects
probit13, maximum likelihood technique which rely on the assumption that µit ∼ N
￿
0,σ2￿
. However there is no
12In fact four of the six votes against were done when an even split was proposed. The same subjects did accept the same share in
situations where the DZ strategy was followed. The other two cases are the mistakes discussed earlier which led to a second round.
13This estimator takes advantages of our longitudal data and decomposes the error term into an individual component αi and random
disturbance νit such that: uit = αi + νit. It relaxes the assumption of independence across observations and employs a GLS procedure











0 ≤ s ≤ 5% 0 53 3 20
5 <s≤ 10% 0 5 0 5
10 <s≤ 15% 0 9 2 3
15 <s≤ 20% 25 11 43 4
20 <s≤ 25% 69 6 113 0
25 <s≤ 30% 30 0 18 0
30 <s≤ 35% 13 0 8 0
s>35% 7 0 1 0
Round One Only
0 ≤ s ≤ 5%
(0 - $1.25) 0 52 0 10
5 <s≤ 10%
($1.26 - $2.50) 0 5 0 4
10 <s≤ 15%
($2.51 - $3.75) 0 9 0 3
15 <s≤ 20%
($3.46 - $5.00) 25 11 42 4
20 <s≤ 25%
($5.01 - $6.25) 66 5 88 0
25 <s≤ 30%
($6.26 - $7.50) 27 0 13 0
30 <s≤ 35%
($7.51 - $8.75) 13 0 0 0
s>35%
(> $8.75) 7 0 0 0
Table 6: Accepted and Rejected Oﬀers











































Sample Size** N=228 N=228 N=181 N=220 N=220 N=190
Log Likelihood -46.960 -31.488 -28.013 -27.557
Share Coeﬃcient Normalized to one
Fairness Index 0.153 -0.041 0.517 -0.156 -0.108 0.000
Constant -0.157 -0.158 -0.153 -0.090 -0.091 -0.050
Numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations.
* Since the SLS is performed over a trimmed sample, we have computed the probits and random eﬀects
probits over that sample, neither produced strickinglydiﬀeret results.
**The sample sizes diﬀer between the treatments since there were a diﬀerent number of elections. Recall,
in the open rule an election will be held in a round onlyif the motion on the ﬂoor is seconded, otherwise a
runoﬀ election was held. As discussed in the appendix the SLS estimates employa trimming function which
result in a smaller sample size.
Table 7: Econometric Estimates of the Voting Equation
a priori reason to believe that the distributional assumption on the error term holds. Hence, we will analyze the
problem using a semi-parametric approach, more speciﬁcally we will use the Ichimura (1993) estimation technique
for single index models. Semi-parametric least squares (SLS) estimation will allow us to test for the normality of µit
and thus ascertain whether the standard parametric technique is appropriate or not. The test statistic we will use
was introduced by Newey (1985) and the speciﬁc version we will implement was derived by Schafgans (1998)14.
In the table 7 we present probit, random eﬀects probit and SLS estimates of the factors that inﬂuence the vote in
the open and closed rule respectively. We also present probit and random eﬀect probit estimates for both treatments
for elections in round one only in table 8. Notice that the fairness index does not achieve statistical signiﬁcance
at conventional levels with either the probit or random eﬀects probit. We also conducted estimates including time
dummies for every three periods where periods 10 to 12 were the excluded group but none of these coeﬃcients yielded
an estimate signiﬁcant at the 5% level15.
One thing which is striking in these tables are the coeﬃcients reported for our SLS estimates in table 7 and
probit estimates in table 8 for the open rule. The data employed for these regressions suggest an almost perfect ﬁt
vote =1{ share+ u ≥ 0.16}, in which case the error term would not be normally distributed since this clearly does
not have an inﬁnite support. Thus concerns about fairness clearly does not aﬀect the vote as we realize that all oﬀers
which gives a share strictly above 0.16 are accepted, all oﬀers which oﬀer a share strictly bellow 0.16 are rejected16.
14A more detailed description of this test statstic and semi parametric least squares may be found in Appendix C and Appendix D.
15We also put in a dummy variuable to capture the ten election session to see if it was signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the other sessions.
The results strongly suggest that there are no diﬀerences between the sessions of diﬀerent length. These estimates along with those with
the time dummies are available from the authors upon request.
16Nonetheless,this is saying that for any combination of parameters, there is no combination for which having a non-zero coeﬃcient on
14Closed Rule Open Rule
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Sample Size N=220 N=220 N=15 N=164
Log Likelihood -44.337 -29.731 -7.919 -7.900
Table 8: Econometric Estimates of the Voting Equation for Round 1 Only
As there is not inﬁnite support for the error term our model is unidentiﬁed and we can not test for normality of the
error term.
There is an additional remark as it relates to the reliability of the results presented in the table 7 and table 8.
The standard errors for the probit estimates are probably underestimated since the true errors are correlated across
elections for the same subject. This problem can be simply corrected with a robust variance matrix calculation. We
conducted a Hausman (1978) speciﬁcation test between the probit and more eﬃcient random eﬀects probit. The
results of the test suggest that the random eﬀects probit is preferred in the closed rule both treatments17. It should
be noted that these results would be weakened if the standard errors were corrected for the probit18. Using the
Schafgans test, we do not reject the null hypothesis of the normality of the error term with data from the closed rule
sessions19.
The behavior that individual payoﬀ rather than fairness determines the vote also appears in the runoﬀ elections.








it)+ µ it; µit ∼ N
￿
0,σ2￿
where vote now equals one if the subject voted in favor of the amendment and zero if in favor of the original proposal.
The explanatory variables are the diﬀerence in the share and FI between the amendment and original proposal. Probit
and random eﬀect probit estimates of this equation are shown in table 9 for subjects whose proposals are not being
balloted against. Notice again FI does not achieve statistical signiﬁcance. The results of the Hausman test suggest
that the probit is the preferred speciﬁcation for the runoﬀ elections20. A close examination of the data reveals that
in the two circumstances that the individual chose an allocation which made him worse oﬀ occurred beyond the third
round and seem to indicate a desire to end the election.
fairness gives a better ﬁt.
17Hausman statistic for the closed rule is 5.785 and is 0.519 for the open rule. The results do not change in the case of the closed rule
using the data only for round one as the Hausman statistic increases to 6.024. We can not compute the Hausman statistic for the open
rule in this case as the model is unidentiﬁed. Since the error term does not have inﬁnite support we would not reccomend the use of
either method.
18The corrected standard errors would yield a larger diﬀerence between the variance covarince matrix of the estimators thereby
decreasing the Hausman test statistic. Note a Information Matrix test may also be employed as a speciﬁcation test. This test treats the
two models as part of a larger model and computes the diﬀerence between the maximized value of the likelihood functions. Twice the
diﬀerence will be distributed χ2(1).
19More speciﬁcally, our test statistics was 4.080, which can be rejected only at levels lower than 77%.
20The Hausman test statistic is 0.189.






















Log Likelihood -29.585 -29.448
Table 9: Runoﬀ Results
It is clear from our estimates that concerns about fairness do not aﬀect individual decisions whether to accept a
proposal in either treatment21. These results are at odd with the majority of the literature on bargaining experiments.
In the next section, we discuss why our results diﬀer from the work of others and present our concluding thoughts.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we examine the performance of non cooperative legislatures theory in the laboratory. We design an
experiment where only the procedural rule diﬀers across sessions. We found that over time the diﬀerent procedures
led to diﬀerent budget outcomes in terms of size and allocation of beneﬁt. We found that divisions in the closed
rule became more uneven with the proposer seeking a larger share of the budget than the other members of the
coalition. However, the proposer never proposed herself a share as large as that predicted by theory. The evolution
of strategies in the closed rule leads to less even distribution as subjects learn that playing the DZ strategy will lead
to acceptance.
Divisions in the open rule oﬀered positive amounts of money to more subjects and were accepted more rapidly
than predicted by theory. In the open rule sessions subjects quickly learn that amendments are costly and propose
distributions which are likely to be seconded. These distributions either take the form of an even split among the
subjects or follow the SZ strategy.
Our econometric estimates clearly demonstrate that concerns about fairness do not aﬀect individual decisions
whether to accept a proposal in either treatment. These results are at odd with the majority of the literature on
bargaining experiments such as Ochs and Roth (1989). They report results from a series of sequential two person
alternating oﬀer bargaining experiments. They suggest that the observed behavior can not be explained solely by
their own monetary return. Speciﬁcally, considerations of fairness enter the utility function. These diﬀerences may
be the result of having more than two subjects split the pie (see Kagel and Wolfe (1999) for a three person bargaining
game).
To summarize we found that diﬀerent procedures in a sequential model of multilateral bargaining with majority
rule experiment led to diﬀerent outcomes in terms of size and allocation of beneﬁt. These diﬀerences across treatments
are magniﬁed over time as subjects attempt to propose divisions that would be passed instantaneously while at the
same time trying to increase their own share. Divisions are more equitable and the power of the proposer is weakened
under the open rule.
21They clearly do not aﬀect decisions in a statistically signiﬁcant manner and also if you compare the size of the coeﬃcient on fairness
to that of share they are not economically signiﬁcant either.
16A Instructions for the Closed Rule
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making. Funding for this research has been provided by the
University of Pittsburgh. The instructions are simple, and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you
may earn a CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF MONEY which will be PAID TO YOU IN CASH at the end of the
experiment.
1. In this experiment you will act as voters that distribute funds between yourself and others in a series of
elections. In each election you must decide how to split a sum of money. Proposals will be voted up or down (accept
or reject) by majority rule. That is, once 3 out of 5 voters approve a proposal, it passes.
2. In each election you will have to decide how to divide $25.00 among the ﬁve voters. Each voter will write the
division that he or she proposes on a proposal form. Allocations to each subject must be between $0.00 and $25.00.
Allocations must add up to $25.00.
3. After the proposal forms have been collected, the experimenter will roll a die to determine which proposal will
be voted upon. The subject number of the individual whose proposal will be voted upon and his or her proposal will
be posted on the blackboard. Once this proposal has been posted each of you have to decide whether to accept or
reject the division currently proposed. If 3 out of 5 of the voters accept the proposal than it passes.
4. If the proposal is defeated (gets less than 3 votes), there will be a call for new proposals and the process
repeats itself in a new round of the election. However, the amount of money to be divided will be reduced by 20%
of the amount of money in the preceding round of the election. Thus, if the ﬁrst proposal is rejected, new proposals
for this election will involve splitting $20 among the 5 voters. And if this new proposal is rejected in round 2, then
in round 3 you will be splitting $16.
5. As before, the experimenter will collect the proposal forms and we would have an election with ALL of the
voters participating. Once a simple majority approves the proposal the election ends and each voter writes down
their payoﬀ on their record sheet.
6. To summarize, the steps in the election process will work as follows:
Step 1: Everyone submits a proposal to split $25
Step 2: One proposal, selected at random, has the ﬂoor.
Step 3: An election is held.
Step 4: If three (or more) out of ﬁve voting for it, it passes and the election is over. If the proposal is rejected,
go back to step 1 only the amount of money available shrinks by 20%. This process repeats itself until a proposal is
voted in.
7. At the conclusion of the experiment four elections will be selected at random for payment. A roll of a ﬁfteen-
sided die done by four voters will do this. All subjects will be paid in CASH the sum of the outcomes of the four
rounds at the end of the experiment. In addition you will receive $5.00, as promised, for participating in the study.
8. No one may allocate less than $0.00 to any voter. Allocations must be rounded to the nearest penny to be
accepted.
9. Each one of you has been assigned a subject ID, which is taped to your desk. Your ID begins with a letter. In
each election, you will be randomly assigned a subject number (1, 2, 3, 4, or 5). This is strictly private information
and is not to be revealed to anyone else. Since subject numbers will be randomly assigned prior to the start of each
election all the voters are likely to have their subject numbers vary between elections.
10. You are not to reveal your (potential) earnings, nor are you to speak to any other subject while the experiment
is in progress. This is important to the validity of the study and will not be tolerated.
11. We will have one practice election to familiarize you with the procedures and accounting rules. This will be
followed by 15 elections played for cash.
12. Review. Let’s summarize the main points:
- The experiment will consist of ﬁfteen elections. There may be several rounds for each election.
17- You will be randomly assigned a subject number for each election.
- At the start of each election you will all propose a split of $25.00 between the ﬁve of you.
- Proposals to each voter must be greater than or equal to $0.00
- A proposal to be voted upon will be randomly selected in each round of the election.
- If a simple majority accepts the proposal the election ends.
- If a simple majority rejects the proposal then every voter will be eligible to make a proposal in subsequent
rounds of a given election.
- The amount of money to be divided shrinks by 20% following each rejection of a proposal in a given election.
Are there any questions?
18B Instructions for the Open Rule
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making. Funding for this research has been provided by the
University of Pittsburgh. The instructions are simple, and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you
may earn a CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF MONEY which will be PAID TO YOU IN CASH at the end of the
experiment.
1. In this experiment you will act as voters that distribute funds between yourself and others in a series of
elections. In each election you must decide how to split a sum of money. Proposals will be voted up or down (accept
or reject) by majority rule. That is, once 3 out of 5 voters approve a proposal, it passes.
2. In each election you will have to decide how to divide $25.00 among the ﬁve voters. Each voter will write the
division that he or she proposes on a proposal form. Allocations to each subject must be between $0.00 and $25.00.
Allocations must add up to $25.00.
3. After the proposal forms have been collected, the experimenter will roll a die to determine which proposal will
have the ﬂoor. The subject number of the individual whose proposal is on the ﬂoor and his or her proposal will be
posted on the blackboard.
4. After this proposal has been posted, one of the four remaining voters, will have an opportunity to second this
proposal or to oﬀer an amendment to the proposal oﬀering an alternative distribution of the $25. Which of the four
voters have the opportunity to second or amend the proposal will be determined at random, with each of the four
voters having an equally likely chance of being chosen.
5. If the proposal in its current form is seconded, it will then be voted on by the group as a whole. If 3 of 5 vote
for it, it then passes. If the proposal is defeated (gets less than 3 votes), there will be a call for new proposals and
the process repeats itself in a new round of the election.
6. If the proposal is amended, a run-oﬀ election will be held between the original proposal and the amendment.
Whoever wins the run-oﬀ (gets 3 or more of the 5 votes) will be the standing proposal in the next round of the
election.
7. After a run-oﬀ is held, the process repeats itself - there will be an opportunity to second the standing proposal
(in which case it will be voted up or down) or to amend the standing proposal (in which case there will be another
run-oﬀ between the standing proposal and the new amended proposal).
8. There are costs to making an amendment or to voting down a proposal that has been seconded. The cost
is that the amount of money to be distributed across voters shrinks by 20%. This will work as follows: - If the
ﬁrst proposal has been seconded but voted down (is rejected), new proposals will involve splitting $20 - Following
a run-oﬀ election, the winning (standing) proposal will have all values reduced by 20% before that proposal has a
chance to be seconded or subject to further amendment. To summarize, the steps in the election process will work
as follows:
Step 1: Everyone submits a proposal to split $25
Step 2: One proposal, selected at random, has the ﬂoor.
Step 3: One voter, selected at random, will have a chance to either amend or to second the proposal in step
2. (You cannot second or amend your own proposal.)
Step 4a: If the proposal is seconded, it is voted on. Three (or more) out of ﬁve voting for it, it passes and
the election is over. If the proposal is rejected, go back to step 1 only the amount of money available shrinks by 20%.
OR
Step 4b: If the proposal is amended there is a run-oﬀ election between the original proposal and the amend-
ment. Whoever wins the run-oﬀ replaces the proposal in step 2 with all values reduced by 20%.
This process repeats itself until a proposal is voted in.
9. At the conclusion of the experiment four elections will be selected at random for payment. A roll of a ﬁfteen-
sided die done by four voters will do this. All subjects will be paid in CASH the sum of the outcomes of the three
19rounds at the end of the experiment. In addition you will receive $5.00, as promised, for participating in the study.
10. No one may allocate less than $0.00 to any voter. Allocations must be rounded to the nearest penny to be
accepted.
11. Each one of you has been assigned a subject ID, which is taped to your desk. Your ID begins with a letter. In
each election, you will be randomly assigned a subject number (1, 2, 3, 4, or 5). This is strictly private information
and is not to be revealed to anyone else. Since subject numbers will be randomly assigned prior to the start of each
election all the voters are likely to have their subject numbers vary between elections.
12. You are not to reveal your (potential) earnings, nor are you to speak to any other subject while the experiment
is in progress. This is important to the validity of the study and will not be tolerated.
13. We will have two practice elections to familiarize you with the procedures and accounting rules. This will be
followed by 15 elections played for cash.
14. Review. Let’s summarize the main points.
- The experiment will consist of ﬁfteen elections. There may be several rounds for each election
- You will be randomly assigned a subject number for each election.
- At the start of each election you will all propose a split of $25.00 between the ﬁve of you.
- Proposals to each voter must be greater than or equal to $0.00
- The initial proposal to be voted on will be randomly selected in each round of the election.
- An individual will then be randomly selected to second or amend this proposal.
- If the proposal is seconded an election will be held.
- If the proposal is amended a runoﬀ election between the original proposal and the amendment will take
place. A simple majority will determine the standing proposal in the next round of the election. The standing
proposal must be seconded or amended.
- Once a proposal has been seconded it will be voted upon by every voter.
- If a simple majority accepts the proposal the election ends.
- If a simple majority rejects the proposal all voters are eligible to make a proposal in subsequent rounds of
a given election.
- The amount of money to be divided shrinks by 20% following each election.
Are there any questions?
20C SLS Estimation
The single-index model is, in our case, deﬁned by
Dit = φ(x￿
itθ0)+u it ∀ i,t
where
E (uit | xit)=0
The Ichimura (1993) SLS estimator is given by

















where ˆ Iit is a mechanism (trimming function) to make certain that for any xit and any θ, ˆ E (Dit | x￿
itθ) is bounded
away from zero, and the local linear regression estimator of the conditional mean of the outcome variable, at a given
point i =0 ,t= 0, is given by



















and K (·) denotes some kernel.
The trimming function ˆ Iit ensures that the conditional mean of the dependent variable has positive density at
any point and at any value of the parameters. For our purpose, we have estimated the density at various points
using an Epanechnikov kernel. The bandwidth was computed using the optimal bandwidth for the Epanechnikov
kernel under the assumption of a normal distribution. If normality does not hold, this as for eﬀect to oversmooth
(?).22 We did a grid search over the unit circle, and for every value of the parameter, we trimmed the three percent
of the data with the lowest density.
For this part of the estimation we will employ the biweight kernel and determinethebandwidth by cross-validation.
That is the bandwidth is chosen to satisfy
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such that h includes k + 1 observations around each it
where the superscript −it means excluding point it. When estimating the parameters, a diﬀerent bandwidth is
computed for every θ attempted by the optimizer. Also it is worth mentioning that we have used the probit
estimates as the starting values for optimization.
22This approach for trimming was suggested to us by Professor Hidehiko Ichimura.
21D Normality Test
Denote the parameters of the probit, excluding the variance and the constant, θp and the parameters of the Ichimura
estimator, excluding the constant, θi,. Then we can test for the normality of the error term using the test statistic
i￿￿ m
￿￿
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￿
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equal to the number of probit parameters minus two and the number of columns equal to the number of probit
parameters.23 This statistic has a chi-squared distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of probit
parameters minus two.
23For a more detailed exposition of this particular statistics see Schafgans 1998, and for a more general derivation Newey 1985.
22???????
23